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Chapter 6 
Mark Byrne 
In sickness and in health: politics, spin and the media 
 
Since the foundation of the state the relationship between politicians and the media 
has been characterised by the fraught, sometimes divergent, but ultimately symbiotic 
relationship between political communicators and journalists. This chapter explores, 
through interviews with journalists turned spin-doctors, the concept of political 
communication through the pejorative filter of spin. It considers the origins, 
connotations, and applications of spin in the context of the complex and inter-
dependent relationship between media and politics and contends that the concept and 
effects of spin – positive and negative – are exaggerated. Specifically it argues that 
spin is an exercise shared, expected and required by both politics and the media and 
that it is driven by a complex set of rules to which both sides are ultimately and 
increasingly bound.   
 
The concept of political spin is so pervasive that it is easy to forget the term itself is 
less than thirty-years-old. In the course of that time it has become synonymous with 
mistrust of politicians and ‘a euphemism for deceit and manipulation’ (Andrews, 
2006, 32). The term emerged from the sporting world, first from baseball in the US, 
and later cricket in the UK. Moloney (2001, 125) notes that spin ‘aligns the popular 
image of untrustworthy and scheming politicians with that of the wily spin bowler in 
a cricket match who, with the flick of a wrist, flights a curving ball of uncertain length 
and line towards the yeoman batsman defending his wicket.’ 
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The term spin, personified later by the spin-doctor, entered the British lexicon during 
the ‘age of spin’ that characterised the electoral breakthrough and subsequent 
governments of Tony Blair’s New Labour. Moloney (2001, 127) makes the case that 
‘spin . . . an aggressive, demeaning work of promotion and detraction by one part of 
the political class for another . . . began as a defensive response by Labour to editorial 
hostility shown by the Murdoch media between 1979 and 1994, when Tony Blair 
became leader.’ Lloyd (2008, 142) noted that the New Labour leadership is now  
‘regarded very widely – indeed world-wide – as something of a locus classicus when 
it comes to the political management of news. New Labour was created, after 1994, 
with the perceived need to manage its relations with the news media at the very heart 
of its project.’ That period, personified by Alastair Campbell, presented the public 
with a new and not always pleasant caricature of the political spin-doctor: the 
shadowy, almost comically media-obsessed master of the dark arts. Spin then, has 
come to symbolise, at least in part, declining trust in the political process, but its 
definition depends on one’s perspective. Regardless, the effects are such that, 
‘certainly we have now reached a time when any form of communications by a 
government is described as spin’ (Andrews, 2006, 41). 
 
If one accepts the contention that spin is a concept deserving of derision or suspicion, 
how should the bounty of blame be apportioned? One could make the case, as argued 
by the media, that spin is a reflection of the unattractive underbelly of the body 
politic; a symbol of dishonesty, manipulation and coercion. One could equally 
contend, as politicians and spin-doctors regularly do, that spin is not spin at all; rather 
it is context and information, delivered for the welcome and greedy consumption of a 
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news media that is driven and defined increasingly by celebrity, rows and resignations 
to the detriment of policy and meaningful debate.  
 
While there is much truth in these converse perspectives, each ignores the reality that 
one needs the other to survive. While the political side of this complex marriage can 
be seen to wear the connotations of spin more heavily – perhaps because the media 
has the power to frame the relationship – it is nevertheless reflective of a game to 
which both sides subscribe. Politics is played out through an inter-dependent and 
complex relationship between elected representatives (and their parties and agents), 
the media and voters. To load the blame for increased scepticism of political 
communication entirely at the door of politicians and spin-doctors is to ignore the 
dynamics of that relationship. Lloyd (2008, 147) argues that spin is a ‘joint creation 
by two classes of people who need each other, in some cases desperately; it was what 
one of these classes, the journalists, who had long lived by “spin”, said was practised 
by the other, whose profession was also indivisible from it.’ Similarly, McNair (2011, 
63) argues that the relationship between politics and the media is defined by a 
‘relationship of mutual inter-dependence between politicians and journalists.’ 
 
From batsman to bowler  
With the notable exception of P.J. Mara, spin-doctors in Ireland – in contrast to the 
US and the UK – have been less to the fore of the public consciousness. One could 
argue that the historical convergence of Irish political parties in the centre, devoid of 
the sharper ideological divide evident in the US and UK, has facilitated a form of 
political spin particular to Ireland: more concerned with tribe than ideology and 
subject to an arguably less polarised and partisan news media. Since the late 1970s the 
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government’s communications infrastructure has grown and developed in an effort to 
meet the challenges of a divergent media and evolving political landscape. Since then 
successive governments have sought the assistance of journalists in the management 
of political communication and media relations, underlining perhaps, the inter-locking 
relationship between media and politics. 
 
Politicians employ former journalists as spin-doctors because of their insider-
understanding of a sector with which they are obsessed and desperate to influence. 
One could argue however that the belief amongst politicians – that the acquisition of 
former journalists might equate to more positive coverage – misunderstands the 
nature of the potential ‘pay-off’. The journalist turned spin-doctor does of course 
understand the media – and as a result he or she understands acutely the limits of spin 
and that the expectations of the political master are likely to be disappointed. Iarla 
Mongey, former political correspondent with Independent Network News (INN) and 
deputy government press secretary in the Fianna Fáil – Progressive Democrats 
coalitions from 2000 to 2005 described the attraction for politicians of employing a 
former journalist as follows:  
 
You know the people, you know the individuals, and you know the industry. 
You know that if you’re dealing with a reporter from Today FM, what they’re 
looking for is entirely different from what the chief political correspondent is 
looking for . . . you also put a human face on the government for journalists. 
You’re one of their own, so they come to you for background, for context. 
You know instinctively what frustrates them having spent so much time 
yourself knocking on the door trying to get in (Mongey, 2007). 
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The recruitment of former journalists as political communicators suggests a belief on 
the part of politicians and political parties that such individuals bring with them a 
knowledge and understanding of the media that might translate more effectively into 
that which is most elusive, valuable and transient: public regard and popularity. Inside 
knowledge and an acute understanding of ‘the rules of the game’ is considered 
valuable, perhaps even essential. Cathy Herbert, former press advisor to minister for 
tourism, sport and recreation Jim McDaid and to the late minister for finance Brian 
Lenihan believes that former journalists bring with them a set of skills that can 
counter the less media-savvy inclinations of attention-seeking politicians: 
 
Even though politicians live by the media and are absolutely obsessed by the 
media they are also notoriously inept at handling the media. In my experience 
they are extraordinarily naïve.  You really do have to coach them; somebody 
who has worked in the media knows the way journalists think (Herbert, 2013). 
 
It is worth noting that while politicians undoubtedly recognise the nature of that inter-
dependence – by virtue of their co-option of former journalists – it is a reality that is, 
perhaps, not entirely accepted by the media. Many journalists who moved from 
journalism to the post of government press secretary have experienced a ‘poacher 
turned gamekeeper’ reaction from their former journalistic colleagues. Shane Kenny, 
former RTÉ broadcaster, and government press secretary 1994–97, was disappointed 
by ‘the level of antagonism and the gulf that was there, the coldness, the warm contact 
with colleagues that suddenly turned into this cold distance of people at conflict. 
Nothing can prepare you for that change until you actually experience it’ (Kenny, 
2007). Richard Moore, a former journalist with the Irish Press, spent 15 years 
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advising government ministers, including Michael Lowry, Alan Dukes, Mary 
O’Rourke and Dermot Ahern, on media relations. He too noticed an interesting 
change of perspective on the part of his former colleagues:  
 
Some of them reacted with this idea that because I was a journalist and now I 
was in this job that my function was to provide them with exclusives non-stop 
and to keep feeding them stories. One or two of them got quite nasty about it 
and then some of them had this idea that you’re just a lapdog of the system 
and you’ve turned your back on the great noble tradition of journalism 
(Moore, 2007). 
 
He argued that the concept of spin is a myth ‘wheeled out by journalists who consider 
public relations as something lesser or lower than journalism’: 
 
I find it highly entertaining that journalists are always on about spin this and 
spin that. In my experience, a journalist rings you up to ask you about a story. 
You tell them what the official government line is and then half the time, 
they’re looking for extra information and interpretation from you. You have to 
give them a lot of background information, and that certainly isn’t spin as far 
as I’m concerned (Moore, 2007). 
 
Dermot O’Gara, director of communications with the Labour Party since 2005 and a 
former journalist, similarly took issue with the presentation of political 
communications as something less noble than journalism: 
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I didn’t even see it as a move to a different profession. As far as I’m 
concerned, what I used to do, and what I do now, is part of the same 
continuum, I just moved into a different part of it. Much like when I was a 
journalist, my job concerns communicating information to the general public. 
In my current role I try to control it or shape it, but journalists do that all the 
time as well (O’Gara, 2013). 
 
The negative reaction from former journalistic colleagues was not the only challenge 
faced by newly appointed press secretaries. Now firmly ensconced within the circle of 
power many journalists turned spin-doctors reported an initial difficulty in de-tuning 
and realigning the focus of their knowledge and instincts. As remembered by John 
Downing, who worked as a journalist for 20 years before becoming deputy 
government press secretary in the 2007–11 government: ‘I remember going to one 
meeting and filling a notebook; the devil in my head was thinking, go out that gate 
now and you’ve probably got three page one splashes and a half a dozen leads that 
you could feed out over the next few weeks’ (Downing, 2013). 
 
Iarla Mongey also agreed that the change was a shock to the system: ‘there were 
occasions in my first few weeks that I was told about certain things and my eyes were 
as wide as saucers’ (Mongey, 2007). Richard Moore concurred but also stressed the 
need to be wary of being fed a story to see whether it appeared in print: ‘it took me a 
good while to adjust and you’re thinking, Jesus it’s great to be on the inside track. 
You had to be slightly wary as well . . . I’m not suggesting that this was the case but 
you were never sure if you were being fed a story to see if it might appear. You had to 
be very discreet, there was certainly a temptation’ (Moore, 2007). 
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‘Handling the media’ 
But while politicians may believe that a spin-doctor with experience of working in the 
media is more useful and effective it is a contention that is not necessarily shared by 
those who made the move from media to politics. Seán Duignan, former RTÉ 
broadcaster and government press secretary 1992–94 observed that while journalists 
certainly bring useful attributes, knowledge and qualities to the role, the tangible 
benefits are over-stated and often misunderstood by politicians:  
 
Politicians never understand that you can’t ‘handle the media’, not really. 
They think that if they find the right person, the right spin-doctor that he or 
she will have the golden touch with the media. Because I worked so long in 
the media, I knew myself that this was impossible. You can feed and feed the 
media and the media will eventually bite your hand off. The media isn’t in the 
business of saying ‘good day for government.’ The media is in the business of 
asking ‘what’s with these people? What are they at? What are they hiding?’ 
(Duignan, 2007). 
 
RTÉ broadcaster and former Irish Examiner journalist, John Murray, who worked as 
press advisor to Mary Harney from 1995 and served as deputy government press 
secretary from 1997 to 2000, agreed that the perceived benefits of hiring former 
journalists quickly dissipate upon assumption of the role:  
 
Once you cross the line, journalists think of you differently. It doesn’t matter 
whom you were friendly with in the newsroom, their job is to make your life 
difficult. You could argue that the political benefit of having a former 
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journalist in the role is over-stated. If you talk to a spokesperson in 
government they will inevitably say ‘I’m trying to get stuff out that’s positive 
and nobody’s listening’. That’s because the media has no interest – the media 
is interested in rows, resignations, and controversy. There is a complete 
divergence of interests and you realise after a while that you’re at cross-
purposes. I remember speaking with a former government press secretary and 
he said ‘nobody wants to know about all the good we’re doing.’ And of course 
he was absolutely right; they don’t (Murray, 2013). 
 
Iarla Mongey agreed that the notion of spin and news management is over-estimated 
and that most of the time, when a negative story breaks, the ability of a spin-doctor to 
manage or control the story is severely constrained:  
 
You might get a call from the Sunday Independent or another newspaper on a 
Friday or Saturday evening to tell you that they have a particular story. When 
they ask you at that stage for a response, you know the story is already written 
and the best you can hope for is a paragraph at the end. They have already 
done judge, jury and executioner and they’re just looking for a few final words 
(Mongey, 2007). 
 
If the powers of the spin-doctor are limited in the context of the day-to-day exchange 
with the media, the constraints of their influence can become even more apparent in 
times of crisis. This is certainly true of the Fianna Fáil – Green Party government of 
2007–11 as it lurched from crisis to crisis. Liam Reid, former Irish Times journalist 
and media advisor to then minister for communications Eamon Ryan described the 
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period from 2010 through to the end of the government’s life in March 2011 as ‘less a 
question of communications and more one of palliative care’ (Reid, 2012). John 
Downing described the lead up to the EU/IMF bailout in November 2010 as 
‘absolutely hellish . . . In the autumn of 2010 things began to spin out of control and 
by early winter things were absolutely out of control . . . It was totally about damage 
limitation at that stage’ (Downing, 2013). Richard Moore compared the final weeks of 
the administration to ‘the crumbling and dissolution of an empire. It was like the fall 
of Saigon, the helicopter taking off from the top of Dáil Éireann with a few ministers 
swinging off the wheels shouting ‘get me out’: 
 
What happens in the kind of crisis that we saw in that government is that 
people get into a kind of a siege mentality . . . No matter what was said, they 
were in the bunker, and the hard hats were on. They found it very difficult, I 
suppose they were tired as well; they’d been there a long time (Moore, 2013). 
 
Cathy Herbert recalled that ‘everyone was scared; nobody knew what was going to 
happen, as this was totally unprecedented. I remember a very senior person in the 
department [of finance] said to Brian Lenihan, “minister we don’t know how to 
advise you – we’ve never been here before”. This was an unprecedented crisis’ 
(Herbert, 2013).  
 
Ultimately, the move from batsman to bowler recognises the inter-related nature of 
the game played between and with media and politics. That there is still something of 
a stigma surrounding the move from journalism to public relations is evidence of the 
tensions that define the relationship: perhaps the media seeks to diminish the inter-
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dependence by marking the narrow and blurry division as one that cannot be crossed. 
While the skills and understanding are both valuable and transferable, one could make 
the case that the effects of the transition on politicians and politics are over-stated. 
Politicians recruit the insider – a star player – in the hope of a game-changer, but in 
fact the game continues in accordance with the rules. Former journalists understand 
that the expectations of their new employer – faced with the normal rules of 
engagement but also in times of crisis – are not based in reality.  
 
If the ability to ‘handle the media’ is over-stated, particularly in times of crisis, then 
what other practical benefits might politicians expect from the employment of former 
journalists? One such benefit is the understanding, honed through years of experience 
in the media, that the age-old political maxim is true: a cover-up or mistruth is often 
more damaging than any initial misdemeanour. As Stephen O’Byrnes, a former 
journalist with the Irish Press and the Irish Independent and government press 
secretary 1989–92 put it: ‘the golden rule of the job that I was in is that you can be 
economical with the truth but don’t tell a lie. If you tell a journalist a downright lie 
you’re finished’ (O’Byrnes, 2007). One might cast a sardonic eye on the relationship 
between political communication and the truth, and yet, all those interviewed reported 
an an instinctive understanding that it is usually lies, not mistakes, that sink political 
careers. As noted by former Fine Gael press secretary, Peter White, ‘spin-doctoring, 
or massaging of public opinion, is a strange business because the truth has a funny old 
way of coming out in the end’ (White, 2004). Thus, while spin is often presented as 
synonym of dishonesty or even lies, both sides understand that to lie would be to 
derogate from the rules of the game, rules underpinned by mutual trust. As defined by 
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John Dowling, spin is more about providing context and background for a hungry 
media: 
 
There is very little that you can do in the role other than begin and finish with 
the truth. There is an imperative to maximise your case of course, so one 
person’s spin is another person’s presentation. Often it’s about background 
stuff. You’d say ‘look, we’re not saying anything whatsoever about that on or 
off the record, however since I know you, let’s talk about it and I’ll tell you 
what I do know’. That’s where spin comes in, when you’re explaining context 
and background . . . Peter Sutherland used the phrase ‘deep background’, and 
you are in Indian territory then (Downing, 2013). 
 
This requirement and expectation of trust between two apparently competing forces 
underlines the interdependent relationship that is in evidence between an attention 
seeking political establishment and a content-hungry media. It is difficult to imagine 
how a spin-doctor could be effective once exposed as a person whose insights cannot 
be trusted. Such actions would disrupt the delicate inter-dependence that exists 
between the two camps. Seán Duignan observed that when spin and lies are 
synonymous, political disaster is quick to follow: ‘if you lie to journalists then you’re 
done. I’m not saying that from a moral point of view, but that is how it happens. Most 
of the great scandals in politics have been due not to the actual misdemeanour but to 
the attempted cover-up’ (Duignan, 2007). Having worked as a reporter with the Irish 
Independent and as deputy government press secretary in the rainbow government of 
1994–97, John Foley recalled that at no stage throughout the life of that government 
was it ever suggested that he should tell a lie to a journalist: ‘it can be a very 
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pressurised job in the day-to-day activity. In all that activity, it was never suggested to 
me that I mislead. I certainly tailored information; that was my job, but then you’re 
dealing with adults who know the business’ (Foley, 2007). The relationship is, 
perhaps, best described by journalist Sam Smyth: ‘spin-doctors are like good head 
waiters. If you like and trust them you are prepared to take their advice. A bad spin-
doctor, like a bad waiter, will try to flog you yesterday’s stale item’ (Foley, 1997). 
 
A jester on the king’s knee  
As we have seen, the image of the spin-doctor as an all-powerful master of the 
political environment is at odds with the mundane realities of the role, which are 
determined to a large extent by the personal and political instincts and quirks of the 
spin-doctor’s political master. Thus the spin-doctor can see his or her role reduced to 
that of the human shield; assailed daily in the trench between an expectant media and 
the media-obsessed politician. Seán Duignan recalled that while he had little or no 
influence on Albert Reynold’s thinking and was severely constrained by his political 
and personal style, he was never permitted to be too far away from him:  
 
The reason for that is the never-ending obsessive paranoia with the media in 
political circles; right up to the very top. That isn’t just Albert Reynolds; it 
was Jack Lynch and Garret FitzGerald as well. The press secretary is like the 
jester on the king’s knee; the king doesn’t like the jester to be too far away 
from him at any stage. Why? Because the media drives him crazy. Who comes 
between him and the media? The press secretary (Duignan, 2007). 
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John Murray similarly recalled the constraints of his role in the Fianna Fáil – 
Progressive Democrats government of the late 1990s:  
 
This was the time of the tribunals and what Bertie [Ahern] knew about Ray 
Burke and so on. I would say 95% of my contact with the media was 
journalists asking why we weren’t pulling out over this or that. It was forensic 
and it was brutal . . . It got to the stage where I actually stopped proactively 
ringing journalists because there was no point; it was impossible to get the 
message out, they were only interested in discord and scandal . . . I remember 
at one of the political correspondents’ dinners, Chris Glennnon, former 
journalist with the Irish Independent, stood up and said ‘I was going to say 
thanks John for all the help you’ve given us, but you’ve actually given us no 
help, you haven’t even risen to a “no comment”.’ Mary Harney was laughing 
and sort of saying ‘good man John.’ It reflected the fact that I’d become a 
protector of the Progressive Democrats through saying as little as possible. It 
was akin to P.J. Mara’s great quip, ‘no comment, and that’s off the record’ 
(Murray, 2013). 
 
The grind of the role is underlined by Richards (1996, 8–9), who argued that, for 
much of the time, press secretaries ‘deal with tedious logistics, they are dependent on 
elected politicians and often they face an unequal contest against the expanding media 
and the large number of political journalists.’ Richards further contended that it is ‘for 
the elected leader to decide the terms of the relationship.’ The terms of that 
relationship can often dictate the extent to which spin and effective (or not) political 
communication come to define a government’s tenure and relationship with the 
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media. As press secretary to the rainbow coalition of Fine Gael, the Labour Party and 
Democratic Left between 1994 and 1997, Shane Kenny’s experience was similar to 
that of Murray’s in that he worked for a political leader who believed in government 
cohesion above all else:  
 
John Bruton was much more ‘closed’ in office than I thought he would be, and 
that became an issue. He said in the Dáil on becoming Taoiseach, before I 
became press secretary, that the government would conduct its business as if 
behind a pane of glass. He made it quite clear to me afterwards that 
government cohesion was the main issue for him and that his key concern was 
keeping the government together. In terms of the flow of information, he felt 
that it was the honourable thing to do to provide information only when 
government had discussed and decided on an issue. That doesn’t suit 
journalists and I knew that I was going to be in a very difficult position 
because the option of briefing (off the record) was entirely ruled out. He made 
it entirely clear to me that he didn’t want any briefings to take place (Kenny, 
2007). 
 
By reverting to a more restricted, and arguably more honest and ethical, form of 
political communication, the rainbow coalition – through Kenny – disrupted the 
balance of the relationship between government and media and, as a consequence, 
changed the terms of the game: much to the chagrin of journalists. Writing in 1995, 
Geraldine Kennedy of the Irish Times argued that Bruton had placed an ‘iron curtain 
around government operations’ and had reduced the flow of information ‘to a trickle 
of east European proportions’ (Kennedy, 1995). While acknowledging that Bruton 
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was more ‘closed’ than might have been expected, Kenny described Kennedy’s claim 
as ‘wildly over-the-top’:  
 
Bruton could, of course, not control the information flow or briefings by the 
other parties in the coalition, but there was a distinct effort being made by 
everyone in the government to work in a harmonious way and . . . a very 
important part of that was that the three of us met the pol corrs together . . . 
This took place after the three of us met the Taoiseach to be briefed by him. 
This united front itself was very effective in demonstrating the cohesion of the 
government. The media loves conflict and was put out by not finding it. 
Differences in terms of handling issues were generally sorted out in the 
programme manager forum, but if not, then at a political level, by and large 
without being distorted and enlarged by media megaphone.  
 
Seán Duignan reported a rather different experience with Albert Reynolds:  
 
For the full period of the Fianna Fáil – PD administration, which lasted less 
than a year, Reynolds gave an on-the-record news conference once a week. I 
went to Downing Street when I was appointed and when I told them what we 
were doing they told me that it was crazy and couldn’t be done. ‘You simply 
can’t have people coming in and talking to the Prime Minister on any topic 
under the f**king sun; it’ll do for you’. Well it nearly did for Albert (Duignan, 
2007). 
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Reynolds was arguably the most instinctively ‘unspun’ Taoiseach of recent times: he 
offered – in a refreshing if naïve nod to openness and transparency – a weekly on-the-
record briefing to the political correspondents, and they, as remembered by Duignan, 
‘did their professional job and bored into him. Very often we would have absolutely 
no idea what topic would be thrown in’ (Duignan, 2007). Thus, the spin-doctor, 
constrained already by rules of engagement with the media, and relative impotency in 
times of crisis, is further hampered by and subject to the whims and disposition of the 
political chief.  
 
Team tactics  
If the reputed powers of spin-doctors are over-stated in the face of crisis, the inability 
to lie and the constraints applied by political masters, it is worth noting that effective 
political communication is further dependent on the mundane realities of internal 
communication. The history of political communication in Ireland lends credence to 
the suggestion that spin and its effectiveness is driven by political realities, rather than 
the other way around.  
 
While the notion of coalition government is now the norm it originally came as 
something of a shock to Irish political parties; particularly to Fianna Fáil. Recalling 
the atmosphere that pervaded the formation of the first Fianna Fáil – Progressive 
Democrats coalition in 1989, Stephen O’Byrnes stated that ‘the government had been 
conceived, born and reared in pure acrimony. The relationship was purely on the basis 
of a forced marriage’: 
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Here were a bunch of people who had left Fianna Fáil only a few years before 
– some of the best and brightest people like Des O’Malley, Mary Harney and 
Bobby Molloy . . . The tensions were appalling. I worked in government 
buildings and I’d meet Haughey in the corridor at least once a day, but for a 
long time he wouldn’t even look at me (O’Byrnes, 2007). 
 
From a communications point of view, this marriage of inconvenience was a 
nightmare. O’Byrnes remembers that, due to inter-party tensions and distrust, rarely 
did he and his Fianna Fáil counterpart P.J. Mara make any attempt to coordinate 
external communications: 
 
At critical times we would call each other and say look; broadly speaking this 
is my line on this particular issue. In that instance he would warn me if they 
were going with a different tactic. We might finesse the thing a small bit but 
generally we didn’t (O’Byrnes, 2007). 
 
The bad blood between Fianna Fáil and the Progressive Democrats was something of 
a gift to the media, as both parties delivered separate, uncoordinated briefings to the 
political correspondents’ lobby, as recalled by O’Byrnes: 
 
As a former journalist, I could write the script for that situation. P.J. Mara 
goes in and he is asked for the Fianna Fáil view on a particular issue. He says 
‘x’ and then I go in later and I’m asked for the PD view on the same issue. 
Because I don’t know what he has said, I might say ‘y’. Inevitably the next 
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day, all the headlines would shout about a ‘major rift’ between the government 
parties (O’Byrnes, 2007). 
 
Inter-party relations worsened when Albert Reynolds replaced Charles Haughey as 
Taoiseach in 1992. When Reynolds appointed Seán Duignan as government press 
secretary he encouraged him not to communicate with the PDs at all. In his memoir, 
Duignan recalls the reactions of Mara, who had agreed to stay on in a transitional 
capacity, and Bart Cronin (then head of the government information service) to the 
suggestion that he link in with his PD counterpart: 
 
I was quickly disabused of that notion. Both PJ and Bart told me that, since the 
formation of the government, contact between the government press 
secretaries had – ‘by mutual consent’ been kept to a minimum. So, rightly or 
wrongly, I stayed clear of O’Byrnes. Nor did he seek to contact me (Duignan, 
1995, 12). 
 
O’Byrnes recalls that, ‘as bad as things were between P.J. and I, in terms of not 
briefing jointly, at least we did talk tactics occasionally and we both wanted the 
government to work.’ O’Byrnes says that in the remaining nine months of that 
government ‘Seán Duignan did not speak to me good, bad or indifferent’ (O’Byrnes, 
2007). Duignan, while eager to point out that there was no personal animosity 
between himself and O’Byrnes, noted that effective communication was made 
impossible due to the mutual antipathy and outright hatred between many senior 
people in both parties, ‘Albert absolutely despised the PDs . . . they hated us and we 
hated them’ (Duignan, 2007). As O’Byrnes remembered, ‘it had to end sooner rather 
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than later because there was absolutely no trust in that government . . . not only did 
we not brief jointly or talk tactics, we didn’t actually talk at all. We were in the same 
building but one us might as well have been on the moon’ (O’Byrnes, 2007).  
 
The subsequent Fianna Fáil – Labour Party government of 1992–94 saw something of 
a new departure in internal coalition communication, a reflection of the recognised 
weakness of the previous administration’s strategy, as well as the strong hand played 
by Labour in the formation of the government. Seán Duignan stayed on as 
government press secretary while Dick Spring appointed Irish Press journalist John 
Foley as deputy government press secretary. Foley recalls that ‘we were a two-
hander. Very unusually at the time we did joint briefings. I also did briefings on 
behalf of Diggy [Duignan] and vice versa. In previous governments there had been a 
clear divide’ (Foley, 2007). 
 
Improved internal communication between the parties, despite the government’s 
eventual acrimonious disintegration, facilitated the effective operation of the 
administration for longer than might otherwise have been the case. It provided 
tentative proof (at least in the early stages) that if the age of single party government 
had passed, then an emphasis on cohesive internal communication was essential to 
effective political communication and governance. These lessons were further woven 
into the fabric of Irish political communication with the formation of the 1994 
government of Fine Gael, the Labour Party and Democratic Left; the first in the 
history of the state to take office without the need for an election. 
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While RTÉ broadcaster Shane Kenny was appointed government press secretary, 
John Foley stayed on as deputy government press secretary and Tony Heffernan was 
employed to represent Democratic Left. Foley recalled that there was a ‘deliberate 
attempt to maintain a homogenous government . . . I was there when the formation of 
the thing was being worked out so we attempted to continue that arrangement, and by 
and large we did. We would have been in touch all the time’ (Foley, 2007). Kenny 
similarly recalls a ‘strong professional relationship’ between the three men, which led 
to coordinated internal and external communication (Kenny, 2007). This trend has 
remained – for the most part – at the heart of coalition government in Ireland. As John 
Murray remembered: 
 
For the most part, myself and Joe [Lennon, government press secretary] would 
have been a united voice . . . there was often pressure from the backbenches or 
the grassroots asking why did we sign up to this or why are we supporting 
that. There was pressure to brief separately or to make a break for it but after a 
while I realised that there was no benefit to the PDs of ploughing a lone 
furrow. You can only really do that once, and when you start creating that sort 
of mistrust and spinning against your partners in government then the 
government is doomed (Murray, 2013). 
 
Similarly, Iarla Mongey recalls of his time as deputy government press secretary of 
the Fianna Fáil – Progressive Democrats government of 1997–2005: 
 
Even where there were different points of view or divergent opinions, I used 
to tease Mandy [Johnston, government press secretary], ‘well regardless of 
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where we stand on these issues we’ll go river-dancing in here [political 
correspondents’ lobby] together’ . . . The last place you wanted to be 
discussing your differences was the political lobby. You might be doing it 
through other avenues, before or after that but you certainly didn’t want to be 
there, and at odds with the person you had walked into the room with 
(Mongey, 2007). 
 
Similarly, John Downing observed: 
 
It is very, very important to present a government front . . . Journalists would 
have loved divide and conquer and part of the job was to minimise that and to 
downplay it. I had a very good personal relationship with Eoghan [Ó 
Neachtain, government press secretary] . . . We were a back channel of 
communication between parties when inter-party relations were rough. We 
spoke to each other and we spoke about how to minimise the damage and how 
to try to navigate through difficult situations (Downing, 2013). 
 
The experiences of successive Irish governments, and the spin-doctors employed to 
represent them, lend weight to McNair’s (2011, 123) contention that, ‘some of the 
great failures of party-political communication in recent years can be attributed to 
inadequate internal public relations’. The importance of internal communication, adds 
another item to the long list of barriers and pitfalls around which the spin-doctor must 
navigate.  
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Conclusion 
The notion of spin as a pejorative function of the modern political environment is, 
arguably, over-stated. Spin-doctors are subject to – and have limited influence over – 
the vagaries of the political landscape, and must work within the context and confines 
of public sentiment, inter-party relations, a voracious and expanding news media and 
the political dispositions and personal inclinations of their political masters. The 
literature, and the experiences of journalists turned spin-doctors in Ireland, underlines 
the symbiotic and decades-old inter-dependence at play between politics and the 
media; each needs the other to survive. Media outlets, whether print, broadcast or 
digital, find themselves with ever more space to fill and limited resources with which 
to source and produce content. In this environment, the journalist is likely to need the 
spin-doctor all the more. Similarly, politicians are caught between the twin pressures 
of declining public trust in politics and institutions and the need to communicate 
through a fractured, divergent and celebrity-fuelled media. The often fraught 
relationship between the body politic and the media is perhaps a reflection of this 
hyper-mediatisation. As Lloyd (2008, 144) argues, there is ‘an extra cause of 
bitterness between journalists and politicians: both see their constituencies shrinking 
and are forced to cling to the other all the more, often blaming the other for the 
declining state of their fortunes.’ Changes to the game – such as the altered media, 
political or economic landscape – bring with them a sense of drift or panic for all 
concerned, but, as has always happened, the players will adapt and the game will 
continue as before.  
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